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Assrnacr This article is an attempt at rethinking participatory development(po) in terms of empire, undertaking a postcolonial and psychoanalytic
reading. Postcolonialism helps point out that our discursive constructions of the
Third World say more about us than the Third World; while psychoanalysis
helps uncover the desires we invest in the Other. Thus, to the question, 'why do
neo-imperial and inegalitarian relationships pervade po?', the article answers,
'because even as PD promotes the Other's empowerment, it hinges crucially on
our complicity and desire'; and'because disavowing such complicity and desire
is a technology of power'. The argument, in other words, is that complicity and
desire are written into PD, making it prone to an exclusionary, Western-centric
and inegalitarian politics. The article concludes with possibilities for confront-
ing our complicities and desires through po's radicalisation.
At a time when imperialism looks naked and pervasive, when 'freedom' and
'democracy' are all but forced on people (eg in Iraq), any North-to-South
exchange appears particularly suspicious. Thus, thanks at least in part to the
growing influence of the Western-dominated Bretton Woods institutions, the
field of international development struggles harder and harder to escape its
reputation as a Trojan horse. And now, so does one of its newest offspring-
participatory development (eo)-and this in spite of the latter's 'noble' goals.
po ostensibly implies discarding mainstream development's neocolonial
tendencies, Western-centric values and centralised decision-making pro-
cesses. It stands instead for a more inclusive and 'bottom-up' politics, which
takes two dominant institutional forms: l) Participatory Rural Appraisal(rna), which aims at promoting local community 'empowerment'; and
2) country 'ownership' of development programmes, where the state and/or
international development agency_ seeks civil society involvement for policy
development and agenda setting. ' In one form or the other, po has become
development's new orthodoxy, so much so that you would be hard-pressed to
find any NGo, donor agency or development institution that has not
integrated it into programming.
But of late PD has faced notable scrutiny and criticism. Critics point out
that, far from being inclusive and bottom-up, it reconfigures power and value
systems which may end up being exclusionary, if not tyrannical (Mosse, 1994;
Cooke & Kothari, 2001; Kapoor,2002a).It is shown to be gender-biased,
frequently ignoring and reinforcing patriarchal structures (Parpart, 2000).
And it seen as a 'liberal populist' approach to development that fails
to address either class inequalities or the negative impacts of macro-
socioeconomic structures (Mohan & Stokke, 2000).
I would like, in this article, to include and extend the above criticisms by
carrying out a postcolonial and psychoanalytic reading of po. Postcoloni-
alism helps point out that our discursive constructions of the Third World
say more about us than the Third World; while psychoanalysis helps uncover
the desires we invest in the Other. Thus, to the question, 'why do neo-
imperial and inegalitarian relationships pervade pD?', I want to answer,
'because even as it promotes the Other's empowerment, it hinges crucially on
our complicity and desire'; and 'because disavowing such complicity and
desire is a technology of power'. In other words, I want to argue that
complicity and desire are written into PD, making it prone to an exclusionary,
Western-centric and inegalitarian politics.
I write'our'in an eflort at self-implication: it seems to me that, whether we
are critics or advocates of pD, we are implicated in it. As development workers
and researchers, as intellectuals and academics, we may make (at least a part
of) our careers off it. As Westerners, some of our sociocultural values and
practices may inform Po (as we shall see below). As members of Western(ised)
elites participating in the global capitalist economy, we may be direct or
indirect contributors (as taxpayers, consumers, voters) to those national or
transnational institutions that'invest' in pn. True, there are different degrees
of contamination here; but my point is that not owning up to the range of
these complicities ensures the reproduction of inequality and empire.
Complicity and desire
To begin the task of excavating complicity and desire from the depths of pD,
I take my cue from Edward Said, Gayatri Spivak and Slavoj ZlLek. Said's
significant contribution, of course, is showing the Orient to be a discursive
construct (Said, 1978). He points out how Orientalism (ie the West's
political-intellectual representation of the Third World) is integral to
imperialism, serving both to subordinate the Third World and rationalise
Western imperial rule. His implication is that Orientalism, while ostensibly
staging the (Third World) Other, actually reveals the West: 'Indeed, my real
argument is that Orientalism is-and does not simply represent-a
considerable dimension of modern political-intellectual culture, and as such
has less to do with the Orient than it does with "our" world' (1918: l2).
Much of Spivak's work is an extension of this insight. She cautions that, in
speaking about the Other, we often disavow our own role in the
representational process, as though we are transparent and neutral relays
(Spivak, 1988). Like Said, she thus believes that it is important that we turn
our anthropological gaze upon ourselves before we investigate the Other. Her
insinuation for us (as academics, researchers or development workers) is that
our representations about, or on behalf of, the Third World are a function of
our geopolitical and institutional positioning (Kapoor, 2004b). Because we
are part of organisations that have their own class, gendered, cultural and/or
organisational demands, we cannot pretend to purity or objectivity in our
dealings with the Third World.
ZlLek, in my view, provides a depth psychology to the contaminations and
complicities that Said and Spivak alert us to. Relying on Lacanian
psychoanalytic theory, his argument proceeds something like this: 'reality'
goes hand in hand with, but is opposed to, the 'Real' (ZiLek,1989: 69;1999:
74). Reality is what we (mistakenly) take to be wholeness or harmony, while
the Real denotes the impossibility of wholeness, a fundamental lack that
troubles any attempt at closure and consistency. For Zi\ek, from the moment
we enter into the world of language, reality is where we escape to avoid the
Real (1989: 45,47). We desire and enjoy fullness (eg the perfect car, pure love,
an ideal democracy), and find it difficult to come to terms with incompleteness
(that is written into the very structure of language), and so we construct a
fantasy world. Desire thus involves the misrecognition of fullness, and fantasy
is 'the support that gives consistency to what we call "reality"' (1989: 44).
While fantasy is an individualised or internalised psychic phenomenon,
ideology interpellates us at the level of the social, from the outside. Like
fantasy, it is a framework that forecloses the Real in order to make reality
smooth and consistent. But ZlZet< is adamant that ideology is not a mask or
veil covering the 'real' situation, a reality behind reality: it is 'not simply a
"false consciousness", an illusory representation of reality, it is rather this
reality itself which is already to be conceived as "ideological"' (1989: 2l).In
this sense, for ZiL,ek, ideology is externalised and materialised: it is built into
our sociopolitical practices and institutions.
But if it surrounds us and interpellates us, how do we go about distancing
ourselves from it, critiquing it? Not through the development of some super-
consciousness, since, as just pointed out, there is no 'higher' ground from
which to distinguish 'true' from 'false' reality. And not through some sort of
postmodern ironic distance, in which we admit we know better than to do
something (but nevertheless go ahead and do it): the TV viewer, for example,
may mock and rail against TV advertisements, aware that they are
commercial manipulations; but the point is that s/he still watches them,
and does so with some delight. Irony or cynicism for ZiLek, far from
being critical, are built into ideology, underlining both how insidiously
pervasive ideology is and how psychically enjoyable it can be (1989: 28, 33).
No, ideology critique, according to him, can only be undertaken from within
ideology itself, by being intimately alert to its machinations. And this means
tracking and identifying ideology's Real-its slips, disavowals, contra-
dictions, ambiguities.
What ZiZek helps reveal, then, are the psychoanalytic dimensions of our
complicities. He points up the psychical-ideological work that goes into
desiring reality and disavowing the Real or, in our case, desiring to empower
the Other and overlooking our complicity. And so, drawing on these insights,
I want to show PD to be ideological. As we shall see, it is promoted as
benevolent, but forecloses various complicities and desires. It is championed
and propagated by development institutions, which nonetheless seek to
obscure their own participation in participation. It supposedly puts local
Third World communities at the centre of development, but actually centres
on First World and/or elite institutional and geopolitical interests. The task
ahead, then, is to track these complicities and desires, and to scrutinise their
accompanying slips, disavowals, contradictions, ambiguities.
Tracking complicity and desire
This section examines complicity and desire as they manifest themselves in
the assumptions, values and goals of pn. We begin by dissecting pD's image
of magnanimity, move on to investigating the unconscious desires it has
written into it, and end with problematising its objective of reaching
consensus.
Nar ci ssis tic sam ar i I an i s m
PD appears to be pulled in two directions at once: being promoted as
benevolent, while professing neutrality in order to 'empower the Other'. As to
the first of these, there is an unmistakable self-righteousness that pervades po.
Partly, this is the inheritance of the field of development, in which the
mentality of the 'burden of the fittest' prevails: not only is pride taken in the
philanthropic idea of 'us' helping 'them', but also in the assumption that we
(elites and professionals) know better than they (impoverished Third World
communities). Perhaps some of this self-congratulatory benevolence has
faded lately, in the wake of harsh condemnation, notably of the socio-
environmental costs of tvn/World Bank-led structural adjustment pro-
grammes. But the emergence of po appears to have neutralised some of
these criticisms and saved the day. Armed with its message of enabling
local community participation, pD has become a kind of development
with a clear conscience. Its 'empowerment' dimension, in fact, gives it an
almost sublime character, so that it has come to be associated with a
series of seemingly incontestable maxims: pD is naturally progressive,
community participation is inherently good, championing pD is blameless
and honourable.
Added to this is a certain religious dimension, particularly noticeable in
PRA. It is evident, first, in the figure of the pna 'facilitator', who plays the
crucial role of the change catalyst. Robert Chambers, charismatic enthusiast
and promoter of pRA, stands as model here. Affable and earnest, he cuts a
preacher-like personage (Henkel & Stirrat, 2001: 175). His writings are
strewn with moral exhortations, encouraging the pne facilitator to shed
hierarchical thinking and Westernised ways (1994: 1256). Like the ascetic or
monk who has overcome worldly attachments, the facilitator is expected to
develop astringent powers (more on this below) and, as Paul Francis puts it,
enact 'an exorcism, of sorts, of phantoms of "conventional" development
practice'(Francis,2001: 80). But PRA's religiosity is also evident in the way
it envisions social change. pRA-led community discussions can become
ecstatic experiences, causing socioeconomic elites (or 'uppers'), in particular,
to re-think their privileges and undergo tremendous personal transformation:
'it means that those who are uppers and powerful step down, disempower
themselves, and empower others...It implies that uppers have to give up
something and make themselves vulnerable' (Chambers, 1997: 234). Seen in
this light, then, the pRA exercise becomes a (Christian evangelical) religious
ceremony, in which the facilitator-as-priest presides, privilege and power are
purged, and the community is reborn.
Running counter (or so it appears) to the construction of a benevolent and
quasi-religious aura around pRA, however, is an attempt at self-effacement.
The logic here is that outside interference and imposition must be minimised
in order to facilitate civil society 'ownership' of programmes or enable
community empowerment. The onus, once again, is on the convenor or
facilitator to be neutral and objective so as to allow the community agenda to
emerge authentically. Thus, pRA repeatedly underlines the need for 'handing
over the stick', urging in its facilitators the cultivation of such personal
behaviour traits as transparency, honesty, humility, respect and patience
(Chambers, 1994: 1253, 1256).
But how is one to reconcile this self-effacement with the earlier self-
regarding benevolence? The answer, it seems to me, lies in the power
relationships set up in pD's community workshops or forums. The convenor
or facilitator may well portray himlherself as a neutral and fair arbiter, but the
fact is that s/he manages the proceedings almost every step of the way:
deciding on the need for, and purpose of, the meeting; selecting whom to
include/exclude on the invitation list; making up the agenda; choosing which
participants speak, on what topic and for how long; and/or shaping the form
and use of the meeting outputs. There are no 'objective', or indeed inter-
subjective, rules or procedures governing meeting goals, logistics or
discussions. Power is tilted decidedly in favour of the convenor, and, while
it may well be used accountably and democratically (as Chambers hopes for),
it can just as easily be abused.
Either way though, given the convenor's substantial discretionary powers,
any attempt at self-effacement, far from running counter to self-aggrandise-
ment, is rather another strategy for it. Pretending to step down from power
and privilege, even as one exercises them as master of ceremony, is a
reinforcement, not a diminishment, of such power and privilege. Humility,
patience, respect, etc, may be the public expression of pD's guilty conscience('I'm a bit ashamed of being in charge of your "empowerment" ,. . and isn't it
nice of me to acknowledge it?'); but these may also be acts of self-glorification
and -gratification ('it doesn't really matter whether or not people are
"empowered", as long as I come off looking good!'). The result in both cases
is that PD centres, not on the Other, but on the I.
pD fits well, then, the Zilekian definition of ideology as a 'lie which
pretends to be taken seriously' (1989: 30). It appears immaculate, founded as
it is on enabling unadulterated participation; upon such purity does its
reputation as noble and progressive rest. Yet it hinges on a fundamental
underside-the enabler's complicity. Its ingeniousness rests on successfully
negotiating this slipperiness. It creates a 'feel good' community experience,
but elides the behind-the-scenes stage management. It promotes the sharing
of power, but manages to centralise power by personalising and mythologis-
ing the role of the facilitator. The latter feature is perhaps what makes PD so
desirable to the development establishment-its narcissistic pleasurability:
not only does one get to stage the empowerment process, but one also gets to
be the centre of attention, deriving enjoyment and praise for it.
Transference
I would like to track another, related form of complicity by suggesting that
PD is, to a degree, the result of psychical transference. Transference is the
displacement of unresolved conflicts onto a substitute object, whereby, for
example, the lover, analyst or friend is a stand-in for the parent toward whom
one feels aggression. PD, I want to suggest accordingly, is the consequence of
transference onto Third World communities of the perceived inadequacies of
our own liberal democratic political systems.
Several analysts (eg Habermas, 1976; Kothari, 1988; Mouffe, 2000) have
highlighted the rising 'democratic deficit' within mainstream political
institutions in the First and Third Worlds. Public apathy and low voter turn
out, they contend, are the product of increasingly distant and exclusionary
party politics. The emergence of various fundamentalisms (religious, ethnic,
nationalist), as well as grassroots public protests and social movements, are
responses to the unaccountability and corruptibility of the state and market.
There is thus a wave of political dissatisfaction and a demand for a more
participatory democracy that has entered our liberal democratic culture, and
in turn, the consciousness of the development intelligentsia.
Of course, such frustrations and demands are channelled in various ways
(eg through public protest), but some of them may be psychically transferred
through our development work. PD then becomes a vehicle for us to try and
resolve real or imagined liberal democratic deficiencies. (Such an argument,
to my mind, does not appear to be a stretch: after all, a good deal of post-
World War II aid and development was aimed at containing the Soviet
'threat' to meet Western foreign policy objectives, and at spreading 'free
market' policies to help in the much-needed opening up of Third World
markets for multinational capital. Moreover, a sizeable portion of develop-
ment transfers today continues to be 'tied', and to this extent, helps resolve
several econontic bottlenecks. Western food aid, for example, is often a
subsidy to Western farmers and a way of disposing of their food surpluses (eg
of wheat or rice); and the sizable US military aid budget helps prop up the
country's military-industrial complex. The transference of which I speak is
thus no different in its channelling of, as it were, surplus idealism and
disgruntlement, so helping to address political bottlenecks.)
A sure sign of this transference is that, when it comes to PD, we ask more
of marginalised Third World communities than we do of ourselves. All
things considered, how many of our own Western social institutions and
programmes (eg employment, gender or poverty-related programmes) are
participatory? Very few, if any. The implication is that we hold the
'beneficiaries' of pD to a higher standard or ideal. As a consequence, Third
World communities may well be a dumping ground or test site for idealised
for-ms of participation.
Zitek helps tease out a further dimension of such transference via his
discussion on 'canned laughter' (ie simulated audience laughter, usually on
television comedy programmes). For him, the significance of canned laughter
lies not in reminding us when to laugh, but in the fact that
the Other-embodied in the television set-is relieving us even of our duty to
Iaugh-is laughing instead of us. So even if, tired from a hard day's stupid
work, all evening we did nothing but gaze drowsily into the television screen, we
can say afterwards that objectively, through the medium of the other, we had a
really good time (1989: 35).
Seen in this light, pD is a kind of canned laughter: it helps us work through
our political idealism and discontent, relieving us from participating 'over
here' and enabling us to partake vicariously through the other's participation
'over there'. We manage the process (and get the glory), they participate (as
directed by us), and at the end of the programme, we come away feeling
satlated as spectator-participants.
Zil.ek interprets this phenomenon as symptomatic of 'commodity
fetishism' under late capitalism: human relationships take on the form of
relations between things, so that we increasingly interact with one another in
abstract, vicarious and alienated ways (1989: 34-35). The irony, in this case,
is the prospect that commodity fetishism has colonised even participation, an
activity meant precisely to overcome alienated human relations through
inter-subjective dialogue.
The fantasy of consensus
One of the main objectives of po is arriving at a consensus. Once the key
community 'stakeholders' are gathered, relevant information is collected,
and people have had their say, a collective decision is reached. The
development programming that ensues is thus taken to be not prescriptive
but reflective of community interests and needs. But to the extent that
consensus is an attempt at making development smooth and complete, it is
a fantasy (in the ZiZekian sense discussed earlier). To the extenf that it is
used to seek definitive decisions, thereby avoiding the risks and messiness
(ie the Real) inherent in participation, it is the product of self-delusion.
ZlLek avers, as a result, that establishing "'rea7" democracy [or participa-
tion] necessarily brings about its opposite' (1989: 5), and Chantal Mouffe
speaks of consensus as the 'elimination of pluralism from the public sphere'(2000: 49)."
Indeed, the quality of the consensus and the power relations involved in
reaching it are crucial. One danger is that decisions are made on the basis of
inadequate participation, for example when beneficiaries are consulted after
the programming design and goals have already been set; or when agreement
is justified through majority vote and frequent community meetings, rather
than meaningful deliberation (ie open dissemination of information, airing
of dissent and debate, inclusion of minority views). In the meeting space
itself, moreover, there may be several micro-power processes at play. For
instance, rhetorical devices-polemical or sensationalist arguments, technical
or esoteric language, misrepresentation or over-representation of evidence,
loud or aggressive speech, monopolisation of air time by a participant-can
unduly influence opinion or silence and intimidate participants. While
sometimes overt, these devices can be subtle, too, as when the meeting
convenor invites technical or scientific 'experts' to speak to (ie persuade)
community members.
The very condition of having to seek a consensus may also be a problem.
When consensus-based decisions are single, as they most often are, they
overlook or suppress community differences and tensions. Frequently, they
ignore precisely those issues that are most difficult to address-class
inequality, patriarchy, racism (Mohan & Stokke, 2000; Mosse, 2001: 22;
Kapoor, 2004b:637). Rather than confront these messy problems, they leave
them unspoken or unresolved. The result is a simplified or distorted
consensus. Thus, Kelsall & Mercer (2003) show how a World Vision
participatory community development project in Northern Tanzania ends up
concentrating power in the hands of established elites (church elders and
employees, village council members, rich farmers) to the exclusion of
poorer farmers and women. Not only does decision making become
monopolised by these elites, but so do project resources (access to funds
and training, allocation of free cattle), thereby 'reproducing existing
inequalities and perpetuating patterns of development which date from the
colonial period if not earlier' (Kelsall & Mercer, 2003: 302; cf Mosse, 1994:
508). The'common good' becomes the expression of hegemonic privilege and
subaltern loss.
My point is not to deny that decisions need to be made in po. It is, rather,
to warn against the fetishisation of consensus, that is to say, the desire to
reach a single (and perfect) agreement at any cost. The tendency of consensus
making is towards closure, and hence towards the privileging of some voices,
and the simplification, suppression and exclusion of others. In the absence of
objective or inter-subjective procedures governing participation (or perhaps
even with them),' this proclivity is ever-present. Averting or abetting it is
once again the responsibility of the convenor. It is his/her benevolence or self-
interest that in large measure determines the quality of participation and the
politics of consensus making.
Complicity and desire institutionalised
Complicity and desire are present not just in PD's values and goals; they are
also integral to PD's institutional arrangements. This section tracks them in
pD's packaging and branding, its disciplining mechanisms, and its neoliberal
conditionalities.
The packaging and branding of participatory development
When participation is incorporated into development programming, it is
subjected to a plethora of organisational demands. It is made to conform, for
example, to bureaucratic review and approval procedures, budgetary
deadlines, andf or reporting requirements such as the collection of statistics(eg participation rates, frequency of meetings, gender breakdown of
participants). It is thus gradually institutionalised, much as a hospital
patient might be, after being admitted, tested, diagnosed and classified. It is
also moulded to suit project needs, becoming a management 'tool' to help
increase project sustainability and results. 'Toolkits' and 'modules' are
produced for this purpose (eg Srinivasan & Narayan, 1994). As a
consequence, PD is transformed into package-discrete and manageable to
suit the institutional culture, and modular to make it flexible and transferable
to various project sizes, tasks and contexts.
In addition to pD's packaging is its institutional marketability. It has
become one of development's latest trends, following on the heels of
'women in development' (in the 1980s), 'sustainable development' (in the
early 1990s), and 'human rights' and 'governance' (in the mid-to-late 1990s),
respectively. Such 'trendiness' is more than just incidental; it is surely
deliberate. Just as product differentiation is a corporate strategy to ensure the
reproduction of consumerism and capital, so each new trend safeguards
development's renewal and marketability. The 'new' turns attention away
from the 'old' (recurring problems, challenges), mobilises new energy and
resources, and inaugurates a 'fresh' start; and so the development machine
keeps turning.
But participation is more than just a trend; it is also an institutional brand.
Its marketability and fashionability mean that PD is now de rigueur in the
development community. It has acquired a certain cachet or, as I discussed
earlier, a subliminal aura. David Mosse (2001: 23-24) explains, for example,
how the Kribhco Indo-British Rainfed Farming Project has donned
participation as a mark of respectability, in spite of the fact that decision
making remains mostly top-down.
Participation's cachet acts in many ways like corporate 'lifestyle
branding' (Klein, 2000). po is made into a self-expressive lifestyle product:
in the same way that to buy Starbucks is not just to buy coffee but to
identify with 'community', or to wear Benetton is not simply to wear
clothing, but to embrace 'multicultural diversity', so to institute pD is not
simply to take on participation, but to enhance 'community empower-
ment', 'good government' or 'democracy' (presumably, a Western-style,
wealthy democracy). Such branding brings instant recognition and respect,
while enabling development institutions to build long-term trust and
loyalty with their 'clients' (governments, communities, NGos). And
cultivating these long-term affective attachments is the best publicity
development can't buy!
Packaging and branding are evidence of PD's institutional complicities.
When it is managerialised and marketed, then what matters is not so much
whether participation works or is well done, but how it can help protect and
advance institutional authority (cf Ferguson, 1990). Consequently, far from
being taken up for people's empowerment or democratic governance, pD is
taken up, first and foremost, for institutional aggrandisement.
Panopticism
Panopticism refers to the phenomenon of self-policing (Fouca.ilt,1984:239).
For instance, in contemporary societies surveillance has become increasingly
pervasive (in the form of video surveillance, collection of social security or
tax data, security assessments, etc), so that people, even if they do not like it,
end up internalising it. This has important implications for pD, since
participation is public, and a public participatory space can be a panoptic
one. Under the watchful eyes of the community, participants perform roles
by playing to an audience, living up to an expectation, or acting out a socially
sanctioned duty. Thus, for example, the village leader personifies the
authority figure, the facilitator acts as the benevolent arbiter, the woman
performs her prescribed gender role, the minority group accentuates its status
as 'dependent' or 'victim', and the community as a whole plays at pleasing
the project funder. to's public and panoptic character mean that power
relationships are reconfigured, affecting the way people interact, information
is expressed and knowledge is exchanged.
The problem is that this reconfiguration of power does not happen in a
vacuum; it happens in the context of already established community
relations. As a result, unequal power relationships, far from disappearing,
adjust to PD's new power/knowledge regime. David Mosse's work highlights
this phenomenon with particular reference to pRA. He finds that what is
taken to be 'local' knowledge or needs, for instance, can be a reflection of the
preferences and biases, not of the community, but of the authority to which it
is beholden (eg the donor, the state). Hence, adivasi villagers in Western India
are found to prefer using eucalyptus as timber for housing; they do so,
however, not because they have had prior experience with it or as a result of
some 'indigenous knowledge', but because the local Forest Department
favours it (Mosse, 2001:20-21, 17).In another instance Mosse reports that
some community members often shy away from giving their personal
opinions at PRA gatherings, preferring instead to provide the 'official story'.
Women participants, in particular, are liable to speak guardedly, or indeed to
let their husbands speak for them, thereby responding to patriarchal and
sociocultural taboos against speaking frankly in public (Mosse, 1994: 508,
514-515).
The realignment of relations occasioned by no happens, then, in favour of
the powers that be. Dominant groups soon develop an 'interest' in the new
truth regime, adjusting and rearticulating their interests in accordance with it.
Government officials may discover it helps monitor community activities;
husbands and fathers may see it as a way of keeping tabs on their wives/
daughters; elites may take it as an opportunity to manage dissent; the po
convenor may find in it a way of manufacturing consent; and everyone may
delight in its production of gossip and rumour about friends and neighbours.
Eventually, following Foucault's logic, each community member will end up
self-disciplining, that is, internalising the socioeconomic, cultural and
patriarchal dos and don'ts. And before long, what were once select dos
and don'ts-reflective of elite/institutional complicities are taken for
granted: they become naturalised, passing off as 'consensus', 'community
will' or'traditional knowledge'.
I cannot help but follow such panopticism to its ultimate conclusion: a
Nineteen Eighty Four scenario. The seeds of it lie in the institutionalisation ofpo. Indeed, most no projects envisage their own periodic monitoring and
evaluation (Makuwira,2004: 8). The idea is to ensure that project resources
are being used efficiently, and that the project is sustainable and effective.
Yet, under a panoptic lens, such monitoring and evaluation translate into
the totalisation of panopticism-the monitoring of monitoring and the
disciplining of discipline! Here, it is not just about people watching people
anymore, but about putting in place institutional mechanisms that ensure
that everyone is watching everyone. Now this may well be a far-fetched,
nightmarish scenario, but as Zii,ek is quick to remind us, excess seems unreal
and unthinkable to us, outwardly because we cannot integrate it with our
own experience, yet psychoanalytically because we are in fact intimately
familiar with it (2002: 19). Calling it a 'nightmare' is our way of avoiding the
Real, which in this case is about disavowing our socio-institutional
complicities (ie our institutional panoptic and disciplinary tendencies, our
voyeuristic desires) so that we/ eo can appear pristine and pure. Thus ZiLek
says about 9lll that the USA 'got what it fantasized about': a Hollywood
disaster film-the ultimate American desire-fantasy-- came true (2002:15-
16). And while characterising 9lll as 'unreal' was a way of coping, it was also
a way of overlooking US state-abetted imperial activities around the world.
Conditionality
Two decades ago participation was anathema to such transnational
institutions as the World Bank and IMF. Now, in the aftermath of acerbic
criticism about the top-down and exclusionary character of their structural
adjustment programmes, not only do they embrace participation with
panache-in itself a suspicious development-but they also make it a
condition of assistance. Thus, for the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (utrc)
especially, debt relief is contingent upon a poverty reduction strategy (rns),
which in turn requires local 'ownership' (World Bank, 2003; 2000: 253).
Recipient governments are expected to form 'partnerships' with civil society
organisations when putting in place their pns.
A case in point is present-day Tanzania. To access funds through the HIrC
initiative, it has agreed to comply with various adjustment policies (ie
privatisation of inefficient' parastatals, public sector reforms, establishment
of a pro-business investment climate) and form partnerships with Ncos for
its pns. But as Claire Mercer (2003) discovers, such partnerships are the
result of a top-down government decision-making process that tends to
privilege elite Ncos (ie professionally run, and usually donor-funded), at the
expense of weaker, community organisations. Moreover, civil society
participation amounts to little more than consultation, with government-
initiated community forums as veiled attempts to convince participants of the
wisdom of already agreed-upon strategies. As a consequence, Mercer writes,
the 'increased profile of tlcos in policy-making engages them and other
actors in a performance of partnership. . .which serves to legitimise continued
(structural) adjustment.. .partnership has become a synonym for consensus
on adjustment' (2003: 743, 751). Similar situations have played out in
Rwanda and Bolivia (Renard & Molenaers,2003a,2003b), with participation
serving, in the former case especially, as a cover for what is otherwise an
undemocratic, if not authoritarian, state.
The erstwhile top-down structural adjustment regime is thus reconfigured
to the specifications of the new pD regime. Championing pD and making it a
condition of assistance accomplishes several tasks in one fell swoop:
participation becomes a disciplinary mechanism for the World Bank/Itrln
to hold the poorest Third World states'to account' (in both the financial and
discursive senses of that expression) and, in turn, for these states to keep civil
society organisations in check; and participation helps advance neoliberal-
ism, promoting 'partnerships' to co-opt Third World states and (elite) Ncos
into the structural adjustment programme.
Broader implications
My point in tracking the above complicities and desires in po is not to argue
that they show up all of the time and in every aspect of programming; it is to
suggest instead that they are liable to (and do) show up somewhere and at
least part of the time because they are integral to pD. The propagation of po
depends fundamentally on a propagator or convenor, who in the current
geopolitical conjuncture tends to be ers as members of elites and institutions
in both the North and South. It is because of such inescapable complicity
that personal and institutional benevolence in pD, while outwardly other-
regarding, is deeply invested in self-interest (geopolitical, cultural, organisa-
tional, economic) and desire (narcissism, pleasurability, self-aggrandisement,
purity, voyeurism, manageability, control).
But PD's propagation is premised on overlooking these contaminations
(ie the Real), and to this extent it is an ideology, in the Zilekian meaning of
the term discussed earlier. PD as ideology is attractive and pleasurably
desirable (in indulging our self-centredness). It is marketed and branded as
wholesome and unblemished. But, even as it papers over its 'dirty secrets',
what is notable about its ideological and misrecognising force is the ability to
appear open, inclusive and transparent: 'The central paradox.. .is that the
very process of production, the laying bare of its mechanism, functions as a
fetish which conceals the crucial dimension of [its] form' (ZlLek,1997: 102).4
Three implications follow. First, the disavowal of complicity and desire (ie
the construction of PD as ideology) is a technology of power, as a result of
which participation can easily turn into its opposite-coercion, exclusion,
panopticism, disciplinarity. Here,'participation as empowerment' morphs
into 'participation as power'. PD may appear pure and unmediated but, for
this very reason, as we have seen, it is often deployed to wield authority,
helping to maintain and further elite or institutional hegemony. Flashing eo
as a badge, or romanticising our involvement in it, will tend to be similarly
dangerous: innocently or benevolently claiming that one is helping a Third
World community become participatory is not just self-aggrandising, but
also risks perpetuating elite, panoptic or institutional power, all at the
expense of the Third Word community. (This of course conjures up the
triumphalist Bush/Blair claim of bringing 'freedom and democracy' to Iraq.)
A second implication is that PD is a vehicle for various types of empire
building-institutional, geopolitical, socioeconomic, cultural, personal.'One
such instance, as underlined earlier, is the branding of po to help widen
institutional spheres of influence, while another is the World Bank/lun
construction of po as conditionality, through which participation becomes a
'euphemism for [global] neo-liberal capitalism' (Roy, 2004: 56).6 In either
case, it is no wonder that PD is a vehicle for empire: in this era of
mediatisation, when image and spin matter so much, the construction of po(or indeed of 'freedom' and 'democracy') as 'benevolent' and 'good' is an
ideal cover.
Note that to make such an argument is not to maintain that power is
conspiratorial (ro : empire building: Western conspiracy). On the contrary,
it is to agree with Foucault in suggesting that power circulates, so that
institutional and social complicities and desires adjust, and are reconfigured,
to PD's new power/knowledge regime. Thus, as mentioned earlier, consensus
building can align with elite/institutional interests, and community gatherings
can end up helping state monitoring of local communities. Now it is true that,
in the current global context, many of these complicities and desires are
Western/Westernised, reflecting Western economic, geopolitical and cultural
hegemonies. But they are not exclusively so (as I have tried to underline);
they also reflect local hegemonies (class, patriarchal, institutional).
Moreover, it is because power circulates that we, Western(ised) elites and
intellectuals, are implicated in empire. For example, as the earlier discussion
on 'transference' emphasised, our development work is psychically and
politically conditioned, so that we, too, develop, amend and transfer our
interests and desires in accordance with PD's knowledge/power regime. This
is why it is too easy and convenient to blame contemporary empire building
on transnational corporations or the Bush/Blair administrations alone; the
latter may well be more powerfully complicitous, but this is no reason for us
to claim innocence or neutrality. Empire building, in this sense, may well be a
broadly cultural sign of the times, implicating the 'noble' as much as the
'ignoble', 'participation' as much as 'trade', 'citizens' as much as 'leaders'.
And this is also why dismantling empire, if it is to happen, must take place at
so many levels simultaneously (personal-structural, local-global, social-
institutional, North-South, etc), a point I shall take up further below.
A final implication is that PD perpetuates the treatment of the Third World
as object and resource. If empowerment centres not on the Other but on our
own desire to be seen as_benevolent, then Third World communities are in
effect regarded as pawns.' If participation is a conduit for transference of our
politico-cultural ideals and frustrations, then the Third World becomes a
disposal site, in the way that it already acts as a dumping ground for toxic
waste or hazardous multinational corporate products (eg milk substitutes,
contraceptive implants). And if po enables the collection of information or
'field data' for our research and disciplinary f matagerial needs, then the Third
World is made into both resource and laboratory. Spivak argues, in this
regard, that the Third World produces 'the wealth and the possibility of the
cultural self-representation of the "First World"' (1990: 96).
Conclusion: what to do?
My point is not that everything is bad, but that everything is dangerous, which
is not exactly the same as bad. If everything is dangerous, then we always have
something to do. So my position leads not to apathy but to a hyper- and
pessimistic activism (Foucault, 1984: 343)
We can save democracy only by taking into qccount its own impossibility.lZi\ek,
7989: 6, emphasis in the original)
My point is not that po is bad, but that it is dangerous. The reason is that it is
fundamentally adulterated, so that along with its medicine comes its poison
(cf Parfitt, 2004: 554-555). Yet this is not grounds to discard it (lest its
p_oison return in even more potent forms), but rather to 'confront the Real'
(Zii.ek, 1989: 48, 63), which in our case is about recognising and coming to
terms with our complicities and desires. In the preceding analysis, I have
attempted to identify this Real by tracking its various forms; in the four
possibilities that follow, I will try to come to terms with it by arguing for the
broadening, deepening and radicalisation of participation.
Publicising complicity and desire
The most obvious implication from the above analysis is the need to admit to
our complicities and desires, that is, to make them open to scrutiny and
discussion. Unilaterally moralising about the correct behaviour of the
facilitator (d la Chambers) is, as we have seen, a recipe for self-promotion
and benevolent paternalism. In contradistinction, politicising and publicising
the prejudices and prerogatives of the facilitator should help de-centre
and democratise power relationships. It will entail, for the facilitator,
tempering and contextualising one's claims and commitments, and for the
participants, lowering one's hopes and expectations. It will also entail
subjecting the PD meeting's rules and procedures, not just its contents, to
public deliberation.
Of course, the risk of airing our complicities and desires is that participants
may not want to have anything to do with us (why would they, if we were
really to admit to empire building?). But, though a failure for us, such an
outcome would in many ways be a success for them: saying'no'would move
them from object to subject of development; it would be a meaningful sign of
their 'empowerment'.
Yet many pitfalls remain even here. The onus for pD's politicisation
continues to lie with us as facilitators/convenors; it remains dependent on our
continued 'generosity' or cunning desire. Moreover, the likelihood is small
that development organisations will be open to PD's radical democratisation
or willing to recognise failure as success.
Extending participation to the economy and development decision making
There are two glaring blind spots in the deployment of po: its integration into
the economy and its application to the decision-making processes of the very
development institutions that deploy it.
To be sure, proponents of participation appear only too huppy to initiate
projects in such areas as education or urban planning, but reluctant to do so
in more politically difficult areas such as, say, manufacturing. When the
economy ls broached, pD is used, as we have seen, to push neoliberal
capitalism, ignoring questions of distribution or inequality. Politicising the
economy is thus a taboo. Zi\ek, in fact, sees it as today's global Real (2002:
65). And so transgressing this taboo, while politically challenging, is pD's new
frontier. It would mean extending participation to the economy by enabling
greater social regulation of both the market and of the freedom of capital.
And it would mean the establishment, for example, of worker management
schemes, peasant co-operatives or community-run enterprises.
In a similar vein, there is a great deal of hypocrisy in advocating
participation by the Other without looking at one's own institutional back
yard. Often the bureaucratic structures and management processes that
sanction PD schemes are themselves hierarchical (which only points up earlier
arguments about PD as a vehicle for managerialism and disciplinarity). A
participatory organisation would ostensibly reverse the flows of authority
and knowledge. It would make management more accountable to its putative
beneficiaries; and the resulting South-to-North and subaltern-to-elite flows
would wean it into better learning from, as opposed to patronising, Third
World and subaltern communities.
Linking up with demouatic politics
A notable hindrance is pD's 'packageability': it is meant, as discussed earlier,
to make participation adaptable to individualised projects rather than
broader structural politics. It allows power to be managed by fetishising
the 'inside' meeting space (ie acclaiming community 'togetherness', eulogising
the facilitator), while ignoring the unmanageable 'outside' (the power of
socioeconomic elites, the forces of globalisation, etc). This depoli-
ticised approach to participation is what ensures that the latter centres not
on empowering the Other, but on furthering our own complicities and
desires.
One way to break the stranglehold of complicity and desire is to link po
with broader democratic movements (cf Mohan & Hickey, 2004; Kapoor,
2002b). This would involve building bridges between no projects and wider
local and transnational efforts for democratising state and market and
politicising new spaces/issues (eg urban slums, sexual politics, biotechnology,
water). But this would also mean having to give up on our desire for mastery
and embrace long-term democratic struggles, with all the risks and setbacks
that they entail (ie their success is never guaranteed).
Hijacking participatory deve lopment
That I have focused on the dangers of our complicities and desires does not
mean that the 'beneficiaries' of po are necessarily passive bystanders. As
Glyn Williams points out, PD may 'indeed be a form of "subjection", [but] its
consequences are not predetermined and its subjects are never completely
controlled. . .[It may] open up new spaces for political action' (2004:557). The
reason is implicit in the above analysis: the disavowals, slips and contra-
dictions (ie the Real) in PD-empowering the Other while protecting our own
interests, desiring to appear benevolent while stage-managing community
meetings, seeking consensus while ensuring it is single and smooth,
facilitating open deliberation while exploiting panoptic constraint-make it
unstable and susceptible. po's hybridised script, in other words, is grounds
for agency (cf Bhabha, 1994;Kapoor,2003);its slippages render it vulnerable
to re-interpretation, diversion, hijacking.
Much more work and research is required on this issue, but there is
already evidence of the use of these types of political tactics: Jenkins &
Goetz (1999) document how participation inspires a right-to-information
campaign challenging government corruption and accountability in
Rajasthan; and Hildyard et al (2001; cf Williams,2004: 569-570) speak
of a pn project in which women participants, rather than using loans to buy
dairy cattle, divert the funds for their own purposes (eg to recover family
heirlooms used as loan equity). Moreover, what this means is that the three
opportunities just discussed (publicising complicity and desire, extending
participation to the economy and development decision making, linking up
with democratic politics) do not depend only on us,o but may be exploited
by PD's subjects as well. The latter could conceivably shame us into facing
up to our complicities, demand more transparent rules for deliberation
and project management, or manipulate our need to look benevolent by
cajoling us into providing more funding or better minority political
representation.
This is not to announce the end of empire building through ro; but it is to
say that even imperial power can be (and is) resisted and redeployed. Power,
no matter whether it is hegemonic or authoritarian, is always hybridised (or
haunted by the Real), making its triumphalism shaky and its victories
temporary. Thus PD's gaze may well be constrictive, but there is nothing to
prevent its subjects from returning a menacing glare or a mocking glance
(Bhabha, 1994: ll9), thereby inaugurating their agency.
Notes
This article is based in part on an earlier work (2004a), in which I sketched but did not develop my
arguments about self-implication and'transference'. Thanks to my students and colleagues at the Faculty
ofEnvironmental Studies, and especially Leesa Fawcett, for their support and friendship; to Michael Bach
for his insightful comments; and to Kent Murnaghan, as always.
I There are undoubtedly several variants and hybrids of both institutional forms. But, in any case, part of
my argument here is to problematise the differences between them: for, if complicity and desire are
integral to each, then they are all equally 'engineered'. As a result, a claim that, say, the PRA approach is
bottom-up, while the'country ownership'approach is top-down, appears unconvincing. The same is
true, in my view, of more politicised forms of participation such as Freirian pedagogy or Participatory
Action Research: while perhaps more'critical', they, too, depend on a convenor/facilitator, and hence
are accompanied by the attendant complicities and desires.
2 I mention Mouffe because , hke ZI\ek, she draws on Lacanian psychoanalytic theory to criticise liberal
democracy. She is highly skeptical of 'consensus', taking Habermas to task over the notion (cf Mouffe,
2000).
3 This is Habermas's answer to the problem: he advocates an 'ideal speech situation', that is, a set of fair,
inter-subjective rules and procedures governing public deliberation (cf Kapoor,2002a).
4 ZiLek is referring in this passage to'postmodernism', but it applies well to po.
5 I am inspired here by Hardt and Negri's historically specific definition of empire, which they distinguish
lrom imperialism: 'Imperialism was really an extension of the sovereignty of the European nation-states
beyond their own boundaries.. .In contrast to imperialism, Empire establishes no territorial center of
power and does not rely on fixed boundaries or barriers. It is a decentered and deterritorializing
apparatus of rule that progressively incorporates the entire global realm within its open, expanding
frontiers' (2000: xii). On the relationship between participation and colonialism, see Cooke (2003). His
genealogical analysis links Action Research to colonial forms of indirect rule.
6 I am twisting Arundhati Roy's line about democracy becoming a 'euphemism for neo-liberal capitalism'
(2004: s6).
7 Although, as the next section argues, regarding them as pawns does not necessarily mean they will
conform to our expectations.
8 I refer here to 'us' as change agents within academic or development institutions. It is, in many ways,
these change agents to whom this article is primarily addressed. It is we who can exploit the institutional
possibilities that I reler to in the first three sections above. If so, we may be able to take advantage of
po's instabilities and contradictions (perhaps in collaboration with po's subjects). For example, we
could push for our own institutions to face up to such contradictions and call for the extension and
deepening of participation in decision making both 'inside' and 'outside' these institutions.
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